Hey everyone, welcome back to My Weird Prompts. We are sitting here in Jerusalem on this chilly February morning in twenty twenty-six, and today we have a topic that is honestly hitting very close to home. Our housemate Daniel sent over a prompt about the messy, complicated, and increasingly hostile relationships Israel has with the major powers that are lining up against the West.
Herman Poppleberry at your service. And yeah, Corn, this is one of those topics where if you look at it from ten thousand feet, it looks like a simple clash of civilizations. But when you zoom in on the ground here in the Middle East, it is an absolute maze of backroom deals, red lines, and strategic ambiguity that is rapidly evaporating.
It really is. Daniel was pointing specifically to the Institute for the Study of War and their ongoing reporting on the adversary entente. That is a heavy term. We are talking about Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. On paper, they are forming this bloc to dismantle the American-led global order. And yet, for years, Israel tried to sit right in the middle, maintaining a working relationship with at least two of those players.
Exactly. It was the ultimate geopolitical balancing act. You have Iran, which is Israel's primary existential threat, receiving missile upgrades and technical help from Russia and North Korea. But then you look at the history, and you see Israeli leaders flying to Moscow for meetings with the Kremlin. Or you look at the Haifa port, and you see Chinese state-owned companies running the show. It feels like a paradox, right? How can you be partners with the people who are arming the people trying to kill you?
That is the big question. And I think to really understand it, we have to break down these relationships separately because the logic behind the Russia-Israel connection is very different from the China-Israel connection. Should we start with the Bear in the room? Let's talk about Russia first.
Let's do it. Russia is the most immediate and visceral relationship because of Syria. Since twenty fifteen, Russia has been the primary power broker in Syria. They have an airbase in Khmeimim and a naval facility in Tartus. For all intents and purposes, Russia is Israel's neighbor to the north.
Right, and that is a neighbor you can't ignore. For years, the Israeli Air Force has been conducting what they call the war between the wars, striking Iranian shipments of advanced weaponry headed to Hezbollah in Lebanon. To do that, they have to fly through Syrian airspace, which is essentially controlled by Russian S-four hundred missile systems.
This is where the deconfliction mechanism comes in. It was one of the most fascinating military arrangements in the world. Israel and Russia had a direct hotline to make sure they didn't accidentally shoot each other down. Israel basically told Russia, we are going to be operating in this area at this time, and Russia, for the most part, looked the other way.
But why? Why did Russia allow Israel to bomb their ally, Iran?
Because Russia and Iran are allies of convenience, but they are also competitors. They both want to be the dominant influence over the Assad regime. Russia doesn't want Iran to have a permanent, massive military footprint right on the border because that brings instability that Russia can't control. So, for a long time, Israeli strikes on Iranian targets actually served Russian interests by keeping Iranian influence in check.
But that has fundamentally shifted since the invasion of Ukraine and especially after the events of twenty twenty-four and twenty twenty-five. We have seen Russia become completely dependent on Iranian drones and ballistic missiles. The Shahed-one thirty-six and the Fath-three hundred sixty are now staples of the Russian war effort. Does that give Iran the leverage to finally demand that Russia shuts down the Syrian skies to Israel?
It has already started to happen. We have seen Russian electronic warfare systems in Syria jamming GPS signals for civilian flights at Ben Gurion airport. We have seen Russia conducting joint air patrols with the Syrian Air Force right along the Golan Heights. The "hotline" is still there, but it is freezing over. Russia has moved from a neutral arbiter to a full-blown partner of the Iranian regime. They are even reportedly providing intelligence to the Houthis in the Red Sea to help them target Western shipping.
And we can't forget the human element. There are over one million Russian-speaking citizens in Israel. That is a huge demographic that creates a cultural and political bridge to Moscow. Many of them still have family in Russia or Ukraine. It makes it very hard for any Israeli government to completely burn the bridge with the Kremlin, even when Putin is hosting Hamas leaders in Moscow.
It is a domestic political minefield. But now, let's look at the other side of that adversary entente. China. This is a completely different beast.
Right. With Russia, it is about security and airpower. With China, it is about money, infrastructure, and technology. Daniel mentioned the infrastructure projects, and that has been a massive point of contention with the United States.
The big one is the Haifa port. In twenty twenty-one, the Shanghai International Port Group opened a new private container terminal there. This is a company effectively controlled by the Chinese government. And Haifa is where the United States Sixth Fleet often docks. You can see why Washington was furious about Chinese sensors and personnel sitting right next to American warships.
It is a nightmare for the intelligence community. If you are the United States, you are worried about signals intelligence and who is monitoring the movement of your vessels. But from the Israeli perspective, China was offering to build high-quality infrastructure faster and cheaper than anyone else.
And it is not just the port. We are talking about the Tel Aviv light rail, tunnels, and massive investment in the Israeli tech sector. For a long time, Israel saw China as the ultimate market. If you are a startup in the Silicon Wadi, you want a piece of that one point four billion person market.
But that has hit a wall, hasn't it? Especially after China's reaction to the war in Gaza. They didn't just stay neutral; they went full "Global South" leader, refusing to condemn Hamas and using the conflict to attack American prestige at the United Nations.
Exactly. The mask really slipped. China realized that supporting the Palestinian cause is a cheap way to win points with the developing world and undermine the United States. As a result, Israel has finally started to listen to Washington. We have seen a significant shift in the last two years. The committee to oversee foreign investment has actually started blocking Chinese deals. Israel is realizing that you can't have American F-thirty-five jets and Chinese five-G infrastructure in the same country.
This brings us to the core of Daniel's question about this entente. If China is the economic engine, Russia is the military muscle, and Iran is the regional disruptor, how does Israel maintain this middle ground when those three are becoming more integrated?
It is getting harder every day. Think about the energy aspect. China is the biggest buyer of Iranian oil. That oil money is what funds the very missiles that Iran is pointing at Israel. When an Israeli leader talks to a Chinese official, they are talking to the person who is essentially keeping the Iranian economy afloat.
It feels like Israel is trying to play a game of chess while the other players are playing Risk. Israel is focused on its immediate survival, while China and Russia are looking at a global map of influence.
That is a great way to put it. Israel's foreign policy has historically been very transactional. But the adversary entente that the ISW is talking about suggests that these countries are starting to coordinate their moves. If North Korea is sending missile technology to Iran, and Russia is providing the satellite guidance, and China is providing the funding, then you can't really treat them as separate entities anymore.
Let's talk about that North Korean connection for a second. Daniel mentioned the Khyber Shekan missile and its links to North Korean tech. Most people don't think about North Korea when they think about the Middle East, but they have been a proliferation hub for decades.
Oh, big time. The relationship between North Korea and the Iranian missile program goes back to the nineteen eighties. The Iranian Shahab-three is essentially a version of the North Korean Nodong-one. When we talk about the solid-fuel rockets that Iran used to strike Israel in twenty twenty-four, a lot of that research is being shared across this entente. It is a decentralized research and development network for authoritarian states.
It is like an open-source project for dictators.
Precisely. And for Israel, that is terrifying because you can't stop it with traditional diplomacy. You can't sanction North Korea more than they already are. They are outside the system.
So, if the entente is a reality, is Israel's policy of staying neutral or maintaining these ties sustainable? We saw what happened when Russia hosted Hamas. They weren't just being "neutral"; they were actively providing a platform for a group that had just committed a massacre.
That was a massive wake-up call. For years, there was this idea that Putin was a strongman who respected strength and that he and the Israeli leadership could do business. But when the chips were down, Russia chose its strategic partnership with Iran over its tactical relationship with Israel.
Because Iran is providing the tools Russia needs for the war in Ukraine. In the global hierarchy of Russian interests, the war in Ukraine is priority number one, and everything else is secondary.
Exactly. And that is where the second-order effects get really interesting. If Russia is willing to sacrifice its relationship with Israel to keep the Iranian drones flowing, then Israel has to rethink its entire northern strategy. They can no longer assume that Russia will be a neutral arbiter in Syria.
And what about China? Their reaction to the recent conflicts has also been very telling. They have largely stuck to the party line of the Global South, being very critical of Israel and refusing to condemn Hamas in the way the West did.
China sees the Middle East through the lens of their rivalry with the United States. Anything that makes the United States look bad or forces the United States to drain its resources in the Middle East is seen as a win for Beijing. They want to be the champion of the developing world, and in that world, the Palestinian cause is a major rallying cry.
So, China isn't looking for a balanced relationship with Israel anymore. They are looking to use the conflict to undermine American prestige.
Right. And this is the danger for Israel. If they continue to allow Chinese investment in their tech or infrastructure, they are essentially giving a foothold to a country that is actively trying to weaken their primary protector, the United States.
This brings us back to the idea of the entente. If these four countries are aligned against the United States, and Israel is the most prominent American ally in this region, then by definition, Israel is a target for the entente. Even if they are still doing business at the port or talking on the hotline in Syria.
It is a facade of normalcy over a foundation of deep strategic opposition. I think we are seeing the end of the era where Israel could walk between the raindrops. The geopolitical weather has just become too stormy.
So what does the shift look like? Does Israel go all-in on the Western bloc? We have seen some movement in that direction, with more vocal support for Ukraine and more restrictions on Chinese tech. But can they afford to completely alienate Russia while they are still in Syria?
That is the million-dollar question. If Israel breaks with Russia, they have to be prepared for the possibility that Russia starts giving the green light to the Syrian air defense to fire on Israeli jets. Or worse, providing the Iranians with even more advanced electronic warfare capabilities that could jam Israeli systems.
It is a high-stakes game of chicken. But let's look at the other side. What can Israel offer these countries to keep them from going full-hostile?
Technology used to be the big one. Israel is a world leader in cyber security, artificial intelligence, and water tech. For a long time, that was the carrot. But the United States has put a very short leash on those exports. You can't sell the really good stuff to China or Russia because of the risk that it ends up being used against American interests.
It is a bit of a trap. Your best economic assets are also your most sensitive strategic ones.
Right. And let's not forget the Abraham Accords. Part of the logic there was to create a regional bloc of moderate Arab states and Israel to counter Iran. But even those countries, like the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, have their own complex relationships with China and Russia.
That is true. Saudi Arabia is now part of the expanded BRICS bloc. So the regional allies that Israel is trying to court are also playing the same balancing game.
It is a multi-polar mess. But I think there is a common thread here. The adversary entente is united by what they are against, more than what they are for. They are against American hegemony. Israel, for better or worse, is the local avatar of that hegemony in the Middle East.
So, even if Israel wants to be neutral, the entente won't let them.
Precisely. To Russia, Israel is a Western outpost. To China, it is an American military research and development lab. To Iran, it is a religious and nationalist enemy. And to North Korea, it is just another way to get paid by Iran.
That is a pretty grim outlook, Herman. Is there any silver lining here? Any way for Israel to navigate this without getting crushed between these power blocs?
The silver lining is that the entente itself is fragile. Russia and China don't fully trust each other. Iran and Russia have competing interests in the energy market. North Korea is a wild card that nobody can truly control. Israel's strength has always been its ability to be nimble. They can make quick decisions, they have world-class intelligence, and they are incredibly resilient.
So, the strategy might be to play the gaps. Find the places where the interests of the entente members diverge and use that to maintain a foothold.
Exactly. For example, keep the Russians busy in Ukraine so they have less energy to interfere in Syria. Work with the United States to provide alternatives to Chinese infrastructure investment. And continue to degrade Iranian capabilities so that they are a less useful partner for Russia and China.
It sounds like we are moving back toward a Cold War footing, but with more players and more complex interconnections.
It is Cold War two point zero, but with a lot more trade. In the first Cold War, the two sides didn't really buy stuff from each other. Now, the world is so integrated that you are trying to contain a country while also selling them microchips.
That makes the "decoupling" or "de-risking" that we hear about so difficult. If Israel tries to decouple from China, it has a real impact on the cost of living here. Daniel mentioned that Israelis love AliExpress. That is a small example, but it reflects a deeper dependence on Chinese manufacturing.
It is the "escape valve" for the high cost of living. If you suddenly ban Chinese goods or put high tariffs on them to please Washington, you are going to have a lot of angry voters in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.
It always comes back to the domestic side, doesn't it? Geopolitics isn't just about maps; it is about the price of a toaster and the safety of your backyard.
And that is why this is so hard for leaders to navigate. You have to balance the long-term strategic threat of a Chinese-backed Iran with the short-term economic reality of your own citizens.
I want to go back to the ISW report for a second. They mentioned the coordination of foreign policies. Have we seen any evidence of that specifically regarding Israel?
We have seen it in the international forums. Look at the voting patterns in the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council. Russia and China are increasingly voting in lockstep on Middle East issues. They are using their veto power to protect Iranian interests and to condemn Israeli actions. That kind of diplomatic coordination is a relatively new development in its intensity.
It is a wall of opposition. And if you are Israel, you look at that and you realize that your only reliable veto comes from the United States.
Which makes the relationship with the United States even more critical, and ironically, makes the United States more demanding. Washington says, "If we are going to use our veto for you, you need to stop letting the Chinese build your ports."
It is a circle of pressure. But what about the North Korea piece? If they are the ones providing the "scary" tech, like the hypersonic stuff Daniel mentioned, what can Israel do about that?
That is where the Mossad comes in. You can't stop North Korea at the source, so you have to stop the tech from reaching its destination. Whether that is through maritime interdiction, cyber sabotage, or kinetic strikes on the facilities where that tech is being integrated.
It is a never-ending game of whack-a-mole. You hit the North Korean tech in Iran, then you have to deal with the Russian guidance systems in Syria, all while trying to keep the Chinese from buying up your tech startups.
It is exhausting just thinking about it. But this is the reality of being a small, high-tech nation in one of the most contested regions on earth.
Let's talk about the practical takeaways. If you are a listener trying to make sense of the headlines, what should you be looking for as a sign of where these relationships are going?
I would look at three things. First, the level of Russian air defense activity in Syria. If the Russians start actually targeting Israeli planes instead of just tracking them, that is a sign that the deconfliction is dead. Second, look at the next big infrastructure tender in Israel. If a Chinese company wins a major contract for something like the Mediterranean-Dead Sea canal or another railway, it means Israel is still trying to play both sides. If they exclude China, it means they have fully committed to the American orbit.
And the third?
The third is the level of Iranian-Russian military cooperation. If we see Russian Su-thirty-five fighter jets actually being delivered to Iran, that is a game-changer. It would give Iran a level of air parity that they haven't had in decades, and it would be a clear sign that Russia has decided that the Israeli relationship is no longer worth preserving.
Those are some very clear benchmarks. It feels like we are in a waiting period right now, where everyone is testing the boundaries.
We are in the "probing" phase. Everyone is seeing how much they can get away with before the other side pushes back. And for Israel, the stakes of a miscalculation are incredibly high.
It really makes you appreciate the complexity of the job the diplomats and intelligence officers are doing. It is not just about having a big army; it is about knowing when to talk, when to stay silent, and when to look the other way.
And knowing who is actually holding the strings. Sometimes it is the guy in Moscow, sometimes it is the guy in Beijing, and sometimes it is a scientist in Pyongyang that you have never heard of.
This has been a fascinating dive into a really messy topic. Daniel, thanks for sending this in. It is something we live with every day here, but taking the time to look at the global structure of it is really eye-opening.
It definitely puts the local news in a different light. When you see a headline about a port or a missile, you start to see the connections to the other side of the world.
Exactly. Well, I think we have covered a lot of ground today. From the S-four hundred batteries in Syria to the container terminals in Haifa, and the missile labs in North Korea.
It is a small world, Corn. Especially when everyone is trying to build a better missile.
Unfortunately true. Before we wrap up, I just want to say to our listeners, if you are finding these deep dives helpful, we would really appreciate it if you could leave us a review on your podcast app. Whether it is Spotify or Apple Podcasts, those ratings really help more people find the show and join the conversation.
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Just search the archive, and you will probably find something related to whatever weird thought just popped into your head.
That is the goal. Well, Herman, I think that is it for today. This has been My Weird Prompts.
Thanks for listening, everyone. We will be back soon with another prompt from the house.
Stay curious, and we will talk to you next time. Goodbye!
Goodbye!