Herman, I feel like we are still processing everything that happened last summer. The twelve day conflict between Iran and Israel really shifted the paradigm for everyone living here in Jerusalem, and honestly, for the whole world. I remember those nights clearly, the sirens and the flashes in the sky. It was surreal. We spent years talking about the "shadow war," but last July, the shadow finally stepped into the light.
Herman Poppleberry here. You are right, Corn. It was a watershed moment in modern warfare. We saw things that were previously only discussed in theoretical papers or intelligence briefings being deployed in real time. We saw the largest scale ballistic missile engagement in history. Today’s prompt from Daniel is about exactly that, specifically Iran’s nuclear capabilities and their ballistic missile program. He is asking if these are separate animals or if we should view them as one unified machine, especially after seeing how those missiles were used in a kinetic, non nuclear way last summer.
It is a heavy topic, but an essential one. When we watched those missiles coming in, we knew they were conventional. They were high explosives designed for kinetic impact. But the lingering question in everyone’s mind, and what Daniel is hitting on, is whether the delivery system we saw is the same one that would carry a nuclear payload if Iran ever crossed that threshold. Is it a plug and play situation, or are the programs more siloed than we think?
That is the million dollar question. To answer it, we have to look at the architecture of the Iranian missile program. For decades, Iran has built the largest and most diverse missile arsenal in the Middle East. They have everything from short range tactical rockets to medium range ballistic missiles that can reach well into Europe. And the short answer to Daniel’s question is that, yes, the technology is deeply intertwined. In the world of strategic weapons, we often talk about the three pillars of a nuclear deterrent. You need the fissile material, which is the enriched uranium or plutonium. You need the weaponization, which is the actual design of the warhead. And finally, you need the delivery system.
And the delivery system is the part we actually saw in action. Those were the Shahab, the Ghadr, the Emad, and the newer Fattah missiles. If you are Iran, you do not build a medium range ballistic missile just to carry a few hundred kilograms of conventional explosives. I mean, you can, and they did, but the physics and the cost of those systems usually imply a different ultimate goal.
Exactly. From an engineering perspective, if you are building a missile like the Khorramshahr four, which has a range of about two thousand kilometers, you are designing it with a specific payload capacity. Most of these missiles are designed to carry a payload of around five hundred to one thousand kilograms. That is the sweet spot for a first generation nuclear warhead. So, while they used them kinetically last summer to strike airbases and infrastructure, those same airframes are essentially the trucks that would carry a nuclear device.
So, when Daniel asks if they would be fitting nuclear warheads onto the same missiles we saw, the answer is likely yes, but with some very important technical caveats. It is not as simple as just unscrewing the front and putting a different bomb in, right? There has to be a lot of internal reconfiguration.
Right. This is where the weaponization pillar comes in, and it is where things get really technical. To put a nuclear warhead on a ballistic missile, you have to master miniaturization. You have to take a nuclear device, which is a complex piece of machinery with high explosives, electronics, and fissile material, and make it small enough to fit inside the reentry vehicle of the missile. It also has to be rugged enough to survive the extreme vibrations of launch and the intense heat and pressure of reentering the atmosphere at several times the speed of sound.
That reentry part is what always gets me. People forget that a ballistic missile goes into space, or at least the edge of it, and then has to come back down. If the warhead is not shielded properly, it just burns up or the electronics fry before it ever hits the target.
Precisely. During the conflict last summer, we saw Iran’s missiles performing fairly well in terms of their guidance and their ability to reach targets. But those were conventional reentry vehicles. A nuclear reentry vehicle is a different beast because the stakes of a failure are so much higher. If a conventional warhead duds or burns up, you lost one missile. If a nuclear warhead fails or accidentally detonates high in the atmosphere because of a shielding failure, you have a massive strategic disaster on your hands.
So, would you say the programs are unified? Or is there a team in one building working on the rocket engines and a team in another building working on the nuclear physics, and they only talk to each other once a year?
It is more of a Venn diagram. Administratively, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or the IRGC, oversees both. Specifically, the IRGC Aerospace Force, led by General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, is the custodian of the missiles. They are the ones who control the missile bases and they are the ones who provide the security and the logistical backbone for the nuclear program. But the technical work is often specialized. However, we have seen evidence over the years, through documents like the ones the Mossad took from the Tehran archives back in two thousand eighteen, that there was a specific program called Project Eleven Oh. That project was explicitly tasked with integrating a nuclear warhead onto the Shahab three missile.
Project Eleven Oh. That sounds like something out of a Cold War thriller. But that is the smoking gun for the unified program theory, isn't it? It shows that at least at one point, the intent was explicitly to marry the two technologies.
Absolutely. The archives showed blueprints and CAD drawings of how to modify the nose cone of the Shahab three to accommodate a spherical nuclear payload. They were looking at the internal electronics, the fuse mechanisms, and the weight distribution. So, to Daniel’s point, even if they are currently using these missiles for kinetic strikes, the design heritage of many of these systems is rooted in the requirement to eventually carry a nuclear weapon.
It’s interesting you mention the weight distribution. I remember reading that when you switch from a heavy conventional explosive to a nuclear warhead, the center of gravity of the missile changes. That affects the flight path and the accuracy. So, if they’ve spent years perfecting the flight of a conventional missile, they actually have to redo a lot of the math to make it work for a nuclear one.
You’ve been doing your homework, Corn! Yes, that is a huge factor. A conventional warhead might be a solid mass of high explosive, while a nuclear warhead is a hollower, more complex assembly. The mass properties are totally different. This is why we see Iran doing so many satellite launches. A lot of analysts believe their space program, using rockets like the Simorgh or the Zuljanah, is actually a cover for testing the heavy lift and multi stage separation technologies needed for Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, or ICBMs. If you can put a satellite into orbit, you have mastered the physics of long range delivery.
And that brings us back to what we saw last summer. During those twelve days, we saw the deployment of the Fattah one, which Iran claims is a hypersonic missile. Now, hypersonic is a bit of a buzzword these days, but in this context, it means a missile that can maneuver at five times the speed of sound or faster. If you have a maneuverable, hypersonic reentry vehicle, and you put a nuclear warhead on it, you are talking about something that is incredibly difficult for any missile defense system, even the ones we have here in Israel like Arrow or David’s Sling, to intercept.
That is the nightmare scenario. The Fattah one uses a solid fuel rocket, which means it can be launched on very short notice. You don’t have to sit there fueling it up for hours while a satellite watches you. You just roll it out of a tunnel and fire. If that missile is carrying a nuclear payload, the decision time for the defender drops to almost zero. You have maybe a few minutes from launch to impact.
I want to go back to Daniel’s question about whether we should view them as one unified program. If they are unified, does that mean every missile test we see is effectively a nuclear test? Even if there is no fissile material involved?
In many ways, yes. Every time they test a guidance system, they are improving the accuracy of a potential nuclear strike. Every time they test a new solid fuel motor, they are making their nuclear deterrent more survivable. There is a concept in international relations called latency. Iran is a nuclear latent state, meaning they have all the components ready, or very nearly ready, but they haven't put them together yet. They are essentially at the one turn of the screw stage.
One turn of the screw. That’s a chilling way to put it. So, during the conflict last summer, when they fired over a hundred ballistic missiles, was that a dry run? Was that Iran showing the world, and specifically Israel and the United States, that their delivery system is ready?
I think that was a major part of the message. It was a demonstration of mass. They showed they could launch a large volume of sophisticated missiles simultaneously to overwhelm defenses. Even though most were intercepted by the combined efforts of the Israeli Air Force and the United States Central Command, some got through. Now, if those missiles had been nuclear, some getting through is a total catastrophe. The kinetic use of those missiles was a way to prove the reliability of the truck without actually delivering the package.
It’s a very risky game of signaling. But there’s a nuance here that I think we should explore. Some people argue that by using these missiles kinetically, Iran is actually signaling that they do not need nuclear weapons. They are saying, look, our conventional missiles are accurate enough and powerful enough to achieve our strategic goals. Is there any merit to that, or is that just wishful thinking?
It’s an interesting perspective, but most defense analysts would say it’s the opposite. The accuracy of their conventional missiles actually makes their potential nuclear force more dangerous. If you have a blunt, inaccurate nuclear missile, you can only really use it against a city. That’s counter value targeting. But if you have a highly accurate missile, like the ones we saw last summer hitting specific points on an airbase, you can use a nuclear weapon against a hardened military target. That’s counter force. It gives you more options in a conflict, which, ironically, can make the use of such weapons more likely in a crisis because you might think you can "win" a limited nuclear exchange.
So the two programs aren't just unified in terms of personnel and parts, but they are unified in terms of strategy. The conventional program is the laboratory for the nuclear program.
Exactly. And let’s talk about the production lines, which Daniel mentioned. Iran has these missile cities, these massive underground complexes carved into mountains. Inside these facilities, they have the entire vertical integration of missile production. They are making the airframes, the engines, the guidance kits. It is highly likely that the assembly line for a Kheibar Shekan missile is the same one that would produce the version intended for a nuclear payload. They aren't going to build a completely separate factory for nuclear missiles; they are just going to have a specialized clean room for the final warhead integration.
That makes total sense from an efficiency and a secrecy standpoint. If everything looks the same from a satellite or a spy's perspective, it’s much harder to know which missiles are the red ones and which are the blue ones. It creates this massive ambiguity.
And that ambiguity is a deliberate part of their strategy. It’s called dual capability. If an adversary doesn't know whether an incoming missile is carrying a thousand pounds of high explosives or a twenty kiloton nuclear warhead, how do they respond? Do they wait for it to impact? Or do they launch everything they have in a use it or lose it panic? This is why dual capable delivery systems are so destabilizing. During the twelve day war, every time a launch was detected in the Iranian heartland, the command centers in Tel Aviv and Doha had to make a split second assessment of the threat level.
That really highlights the tension we felt last summer. Every time a launch was detected, there was that split second of wondering, "What is on that thing?" Even though the intelligence suggested it was all conventional, the what if is always there.
And that brings us to the nuclear side of the house. As of today, February nineteenth, twenty twenty six, we know Iran has been enriching uranium to sixty percent for years. To get to ninety percent, which is considered weapons grade, is technically a very small step. Once you have a stockpile of ninety percent enriched uranium, you have the fuel. The question then is how long it takes to build the package to fit Daniel’s unified program. Some estimates say it’s six months to a year; others say they might have already done the non nuclear testing needed to make it happen much faster.
You mean the high explosive testing? Like the kind they were accused of doing at the Parchin military complex years ago?
Exactly. To make a nuclear bomb work, you have to use conventional high explosives to compress the uranium core perfectly symmetrically. It’s like squeezing an orange so hard and so evenly that it turns into a diamond. You can test that explosive lens system without using any actual nuclear material. You just use a heavy metal like tungsten or depleted uranium as a stand in. If Iran has already perfected those lenses, then the unified part of the program is basically just waiting for the order to assemble.
It’s like having all the pieces of a very complex Lego set, but they are kept in different boxes until the very last minute. The instructions are there, the pieces are there, and the person who knows how to build it is standing by.
That’s a great analogy. And the missile box is the one they’ve been opening and playing with the most. By using them in the twelve day war last summer, they’ve essentially vetted the delivery mechanism. They know the rockets work. They know the guidance works. They know the launch crews can operate under fire. That is a huge amount of operational data that feeds directly into the readiness of a potential nuclear force.
So, to Daniel’s question, if we see them fitting warheads onto these missiles, it’s not a pivot to a new program. It’s the culmination of the existing one. They are two sides of the same coin.
I would go even further and say the ballistic missile program is the face of the program, while the nuclear side is the heart. One provides the reach, the other provides the power. Without the missiles, the nuclear program is just a bunch of underground labs that can’t threaten anyone far away. Without the nuclear program, the missiles are just very expensive, very fast ways to deliver relatively small amounts of damage. Together, they create a strategic deterrent that changes the entire map of the Middle East.
It’s also worth noting the international response. For years, the Western powers tried to separate these issues. They wanted to negotiate on the nuclear program through the JCPOA, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, while leaving the missile program for later. But the Iranians always refused to discuss the missiles. They saw them as their sovereign right for defense. In hindsight, that refusal makes perfect sense if you view them as a unified program. Why would you give up the delivery system for the weapon you are trying to build?
It was a major flaw in the original diplomatic approach. You can’t treat the bullet and the gun as separate problems when they are being designed to work together. And now, in early twenty twenty six, we are seeing the consequences of that. The breakout time is almost non existent, and the delivery systems are more advanced than ever.
Let’s talk about the non nuclear kinetic fashion Daniel mentioned. During that conflict, we saw the use of drones alongside the missiles. Does that factor into the nuclear conversation? Could you put a nuclear weapon on a drone?
Theoretically, yes, but it’s much less likely for a first generation weapon. Nuclear warheads are heavy. Even a small one might weigh several hundred kilograms. A drone like the Shahed one thirty six, which we saw used in swarms, only carries a thirty to fifty kilogram warhead. You would need a much larger, much more sophisticated drone, something more like an unmanned cruise missile, to carry a nuke. Ballistic missiles are still the preferred choice because they are so fast. A drone takes hours to reach its target; a ballistic missile takes minutes. For a nuclear strike, speed is everything.
Right, because you want to hit the target before they can move their assets or launch a counterstrike. It’s about that first strike capability.
Or second strike capability. If Iran’s bases are attacked, they want to be able to launch from those underground silos before they are destroyed. That’s why the solid fuel technology is so critical. Liquid fuel missiles are like old cars that won't start in the morning; you have to coax them. Solid fuel is like a modern electric car; you just hit the button and go.
You know, thinking back to those twelve days last summer, the sheer variety of missiles was what was so striking. It wasn't just one type. It was a whole symphony of different ranges and speeds. It felt like they were testing their entire catalog. We saw the Haj Qasem missile, which is named after Qasem Soleimani, and that one is a solid fuel missile with a range of about fourteen hundred kilometers.
They were. And they were also testing Israel’s defenses. They wanted to see how the Iron Dome handled the drones, how David’s Sling handled the medium range stuff, and how the Arrow three handled the stuff coming from the upper atmosphere. Every intercept gave Iran’s engineers data on how to improve their penetration aids. Things like decoys, or maneuvering reentry vehicles that zig zag to confuse the radar.
Penetration aids. That’s another term that sounds like it’s from a textbook but has terrifying real world implications. If a missile can release ten decoys that look like warheads to a radar, the defender has to shoot at all of them. You run out of interceptors very quickly.
Exactly. And if one of those eleven objects is a nuclear warhead, the math is not in your favor. This is why Daniel’s question is so poignant. The kinetic war we saw last summer wasn't just a conflict; it was a massive, high stakes research and development exercise for a unified strategic program.
So, where does this leave us? If the programs are unified, and the delivery systems are proven, what is the takeaway for the next year or two? Are we just waiting for the final piece of the puzzle?
I think we are in a period of strategic patience on their part. They have shown what they can do. They have established a new normal where they can strike directly from Iranian soil at targets in Israel. Now, they are likely focusing on the final technical hurdles of weaponization. The IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency, has been sounding the alarm about their lack of access to certain sites. That usually means something is happening behind the scenes that they don't want the inspectors to see.
It’s a sobering thought. We often talk about these things in technical terms, like circular error probable or fissile isotopes, but at the end of the day, we are talking about the potential for unimaginable destruction. Living here in Jerusalem, you can’t help but feel the weight of that.
You really can't. But I think understanding the technical reality helps to cut through the noise. When people say "Oh, the missile program is just for defense" or "The nuclear program is just for energy," we have to look at the engineering. The engineering tells a different story. The engineering says these are parts of a single, coherent strategic vision.
That’s a really important distinction. The why is often hidden in the how. If you build a specific kind of rocket with a specific kind of nose cone, you are telling the world what you intend to do with it, whether you admit it or not.
Right. It’s like finding a specialized holster in someone’s house. They might tell you they don't own a gun, but that holster was made for a very specific model of pistol. You don't buy the holster unless you plan on having the gun.
That is a perfect analogy for the reentry vehicles we’ve been talking about. You don't build a shielded, heat resistant nose cone for a two thousand kilometer missile just to carry a few hundred pounds of conventional explosives that might miss the target by fifty meters. You build it for a weapon that has a much larger margin of error.
Exactly. A nuclear weapon turns a near miss into a total hit. That is the cold, hard logic of it.
So, for our listeners who are trying to wrap their heads around this, what are the key things they should watch for? If they see a headline in the next few months, what should trigger that unified program alarm?
First, watch for any news about miniaturization or warhead design tests. Even if they are just rumors or intelligence leaks, that is the final piece of the weaponization pillar. Second, watch for satellite launches. As we said, these are often ICBM tests in disguise. If they successfully put a heavy satellite into a high orbit using a rocket like the Qaem one hundred, it means they have mastered the heavy lift capability for a large warhead. And third, watch for any changes in their nozzle technology or vector control. That’s the stuff that makes missiles maneuverable and harder to hit.
And I would add, watch the diplomatic language. If the talk of red lines starts to shift from enrichment to delivery, that tells you the international community is finally acknowledging the unified nature of the threat.
Good point. For a long time, the red line was just having the fuel. But if you have the fuel and a fleet of hyper accurate, dual capable missiles, the red line is already in your rearview mirror.
It’s a lot to take in. I think Daniel really hit on the core of the issue here. It’s not about two separate tracks; it’s about a single train moving toward a very specific destination.
It really is. And I think the twelve day war last summer was the moment the train picked up a lot of speed. They proved the tracks were solid, and they proved the engine could handle the load.
Well, Herman, I think we’ve thoroughly explored the weird prompt for today. It’s a lot less weird and a lot more real when you break it down like this.
It is. But that’s why we do this, right? To understand the world as it actually is, not just as it appears in the headlines.
Absolutely. And to our listeners, we know this was a bit of a heavier episode, but these are the conversations that matter. If you found this helpful or if it gave you a new perspective on the news, we’d really appreciate it if you could leave a review on your podcast app. Whether it’s Spotify or Apple Podcasts, those reviews really help other curious minds find us.
Yeah, it genuinely makes a difference for the show. And if you have your own thoughts or a prompt you want us to dive into, you can always reach out to us at show at myweirdprompts dot com or through the contact form on our website, myweirdprompts dot com. We love hearing from you guys.
We really do. We’ll be back next time with another deep dive. This has been My Weird Prompts.
Thanks for listening. Stay curious, everyone.
See you next time. Goodbye.
