Daniel sent us this one, and it's a two-parter. First, he wants to know what the SS7 protocol actually is — we mentioned it in passing when we talked about stingrays, specifically that access to SS7 data is relatively unregulated and can provide coarse location data. Second, and this is the real question, he's wondering about practical implications. If non-VoIP phone calls leave metadata that can be mined through SS7, should we be using VPNs whenever possible, even when we're on cellular data and not just on untrusted Wi-Fi? There's a lot to unpack here.
By the way, DeepSeek V four Pro is writing our script today. Which feels appropriate for a conversation about telecom infrastructure that most people have never heard of but that touches every single phone call they make.
DeepSeek handling the SS7 explainer. I appreciate the symmetry. Alright, let's start with the basics. What is SS7? Because I think most people hear "protocol" and their eyes glaze over, but this one is genuinely worth understanding.
Signalling System Number Seven. It was designed in the nineteen seventies, finalized in the early eighties, and it's the backbone of how phone networks talk to each other. When you make a call, when you send a text, when your phone roams from one tower to another — SS7 is the hidden layer that sets up the call, routes it, and tears it down when you hang up. It's the nervous system of the global phone network.
It's not carrying the actual conversation. It's the handshake before the conversation.
It's the control plane, not the data plane. SS7 handles call setup, number translation, short message service routing, prepaid billing checks, and crucially for our conversation, location lookups. When someone calls you and you're roaming in another country, SS7 is how your home network finds you. It queries your current network, your current network says "he's on this tower," and the call gets routed. That's the feature. The bug is that anyone with SS7 access can run those same queries.
When you say "anyone with SS7 access," you're not talking about a highly restricted club.
Not even close. SS7 was built on a trust model. The assumption was that only legitimate telecom operators would ever be on the network. In the nineteen seventies, that made sense. Phone companies were state-owned monopolies in most countries. You had maybe a few dozen trusted entities globally. Fast forward to today, and there are thousands of mobile network operators, MVNOs, interconnect providers, roaming hubs, and third-party service providers that have SS7 access. Many of them are in jurisdictions with minimal regulatory oversight. And the protocol itself has no built-in authentication. If you're on the network, you can issue queries. There's no cryptographic verification that you are who you say you are or that your query is legitimate.
The security model is essentially "you're in the clubhouse, therefore we trust you." And the clubhouse has thousands of members, some of whom are running operations out of a strip mall in a jurisdiction that doesn't care.
I saw a piece from four-oh-four Media recently — the Department of Homeland Security has formally acknowledged that China, Russia, Iran, and Israel are actively exploiting SS7 vulnerabilities to spy on people inside the United States. This isn't theoretical. The DHS put out an official bulletin about it.
Israel's on that list. That's awkward given where we're sitting.
And look, every country with signals intelligence capabilities uses SS7. The United States certainly does. The NSA has been exploiting SS7 for decades. But the fact that DHS is publicly naming allies alongside adversaries tells you how widespread and uncontrolled this has become.
Let's get into the mechanics, because Daniel's question is practical. What exactly can someone do with SS7 access? You mentioned coarse location data.
There are a few main attack vectors. The first is location tracking. SS7 has a message type called "Provide Subscriber Information" or sometimes "Any Time Interrogation." You send that query to someone's home network, and it returns the cell ID or the Mobile Country Code and Mobile Network Code of where that person's phone currently is. It's not GPS precision, but it tells you which cell tower they're connected to, which in urban areas gives you location within a few hundred meters. In rural areas, maybe a few kilometers.
You can do this without the target ever knowing.
No text message, no notification, no call log entry. Your phone doesn't even know the query happened. It's entirely between networks. The second major attack is call and SMS interception. You can redirect a target's incoming calls and texts to a device you control. There was a famous demonstration in twenty fourteen — a German security researcher named Karsten Nohl showed how he could intercept calls to a US congressman's phone using SS7, with the congressman's permission for the demo. He just needed access to an SS7 interconnect provider.
In the United States. Using a commercially available service.
And the Washington Post covered this back in twenty fourteen. They found companies openly selling SS7-based location tracking services. Not to governments — to anyone who could pay. The article's headline was "For sale: Systems that can secretly track where cellphone users go around the globe." That was over a decade ago, and the fundamental problem hasn't been fixed.
Why hasn't it been fixed? It seems like a glaring hole.
Because replacing SS7 means replacing the entire global signalling infrastructure. There is a successor protocol suite called Diameter, which is used in four G and five G networks, and it has better security features. But here's the thing — four G and five G networks still have to interoperate with older networks. Your shiny five G phone still falls back to SS7 when it's roaming in a country with older infrastructure, or when it's communicating with someone on a network that uses SS7. The Economist ran a piece on this a couple years ago with a brutal headline: "It is dangerously easy to hack the world's phones." They made the point that even as we deploy newer protocols, the legacy SS7 network remains accessible and exploitable.
It's not just that SS7 is still around. It's that the entire system is designed to be backward-compatible, and that backward compatibility is the attack surface.
And there's a third attack vector that's even more invasive. With SS7 access, you can actually downgrade a target's connection from four G or five G down to two G or three G, which forces them onto older encryption standards that are trivial to crack. You can then intercept calls and data in real time. This is an active attack, not just passive metadata collection.
Daniel's question about whether to use a VPN even on cellular data starts to make a lot of sense. But let me push on this a bit. If I'm using a VPN on my phone, my internet traffic is encrypted and tunneled. Does that protect me from SS7-based attacks, or are we talking about different layers of the stack?
This is where we need to be precise about what a VPN does and doesn't protect. A VPN encrypts your IP traffic — your web browsing, your app data, anything that goes over the internet. It prevents your mobile network operator and anyone snooping on the network from seeing what websites you visit, what data you're sending. But SS7 operates at the telecom signalling layer, below IP. Your phone calls and SMS messages don't go through your VPN. They go through the carrier's voice and SMS infrastructure, which is routed via SS7.
If I'm on a VPN, my WhatsApp call is protected because it's VoIP, it goes over IP, it's encrypted end to end. But my regular phone call to my mom? That's going through SS7, and the VPN does nothing for that.
And this is the key distinction. If you're using Signal, WhatsApp, FaceTime Audio, or any end-to-end encrypted VoIP service, your call content is protected regardless of SS7. The metadata — who you called, when, for how long — that's still visible to the carrier and potentially to anyone with SS7 access. But the content of the call is encrypted at the application layer and never touches the SS7 control plane as audio.
What about the metadata? The who-called-whom? That's where SS7 really shines for surveillance.
SS7 gives you call detail records. Who called whom, when, for how long. It gives you location data. It gives you the IMSI and IMEI of the devices involved. This is metadata, but metadata is extraordinarily revealing. The classic line is "we kill people based on metadata." That's not hyperbole. If you know someone called a particular number in a particular region at a particular time and then moved to a particular location, you can build a targeting profile without ever hearing a word they said.
This metadata is generated whether you're using VoIP or not?
For VoIP calls, the metadata situation is more complex. If you're making a WhatsApp call over cellular data, your carrier sees that you're sending data to WhatsApp's servers. They see the IP addresses, the data volume, the timing. They can infer that you're making a call, and they can see who you're communicating with at the IP level. But they don't get the SS7-style call setup metadata — there's no phone number routing involved. The metadata is different, and in some ways less rich, but it's still metadata. Signal is particularly good at minimizing metadata — they've designed their protocol specifically to reveal as little as possible. WhatsApp collects more metadata, and that metadata can be shared with law enforcement.
Let me try to synthesize this for Daniel's practical question. He says he currently uses VPNs only when on untrusted Wi-Fi, like at airports. He's wondering if he should use a VPN all the time, even on cellular data. My read is: a VPN helps, but it's not a complete solution, and what you're really protecting against depends on your threat model.
Let's break it down. If your threat is your mobile carrier or your government collecting your browsing history and app data, a VPN absolutely helps, even on cellular. Your carrier can't see what sites you're visiting or what data you're sending if it's all tunneled through a VPN. They just see encrypted traffic going to a VPN server. That's a meaningful privacy improvement.
If your threat is a state actor with SS7 access doing location tracking or call metadata collection, the VPN does nothing for that.
Your phone still registers with cell towers. Your location is still trackable via SS7 queries. Your regular calls and SMS still generate SS7 metadata. The VPN is protecting your IP traffic, which is valuable, but it's not a silver bullet.
There's another layer here. If you're using a VPN, you're shifting trust from your mobile carrier to your VPN provider. A lot of VPN providers are shady. They log traffic, they sell data, they get compromised. So you're not eliminating the trust problem — you're just moving it.
That's a crucial point. The VPN market is full of providers making promises they don't keep. There have been multiple cases of "no-log" VPNs that turned out to be logging everything and handing it over to authorities. If you're going to use a VPN, you need to pick one that has actually been audited and has a track record. Proton VPN, Mullvad, IVPN — these are the ones that security researchers tend to trust. But even then, you're trusting their infrastructure and their jurisdiction.
Let's talk about what Daniel can actually do to reduce his SS7 exposure, because I think that's the practical question underneath all of this. He's clearly concerned, and he should be. What steps actually move the needle?
First and most impactful: stop using regular phone calls and SMS for anything sensitive. Move to Signal. Signal uses end-to-end encryption for calls and messages, and it's designed to minimize metadata. It doesn't route through SS7. It's not perfect — nothing is — but it fundamentally removes you from the SS7 attack surface for communications.
The key word there is "sensitive." You don't need to route every call through Signal. But if you're having a conversation that you wouldn't want intercepted, don't use the regular phone dialer. Use an encrypted VoIP app.
Second: disable two G and three G on your phone if your device and carrier support it. On most modern phones, you can go into settings and force the device to use only four G and five G networks. This prevents the downgrade attack I mentioned, where an attacker forces your phone onto an older, crackable standard.
That's a good one, and I don't think most people know they can do that. On an iPhone, it's under cellular data options, voice and data. You can select LTE or five G only.
Third: be aware that airplane mode is your friend when you don't need connectivity. Your phone can't be tracked via SS7 if it's not connected to a network. If you're in a sensitive location or having a sensitive conversation in person, airplane mode eliminates the tracking vector entirely.
Or a Faraday bag, if you want to get fancy about it. But airplane mode is simpler and doesn't make you look like a spy.
Fourth: consider using a VPN on cellular data, as Daniel suggested, but understand what it protects and what it doesn't. It protects your IP traffic from your carrier. It does not protect your SS7 metadata. But protecting your IP traffic is still worthwhile, especially if you're on a carrier that monetizes your browsing data.
Fifth, which nobody wants to hear: consider whether you need to carry a phone at all in certain situations. If you're going somewhere and you don't want your location tracked, leave the phone at home or turn it off completely. Powering it off is the only way to be sure it's not radiating.
Even then, you have to trust that it's actually off. There have been persistent concerns about baseband-level compromises where a phone appears to be off but the baseband processor is still active. But for most threat models, powering off is sufficient.
Let's talk about the policy side of this for a moment, because I think it's important context. The SS7 vulnerability has been known for decades. Why hasn't it been fixed? And is anyone actually working on this?
The GSMA, which is the industry association for mobile network operators, has been aware of SS7 vulnerabilities since at least two thousand eight. They've published guidelines for operators on how to filter SS7 traffic and block malicious queries. They've introduced a system called the SS7 Firewall, which monitors signalling traffic and blocks suspicious requests. But implementation is voluntary, patchy, and expensive.
Voluntary, patchy, and expensive. Three words that guarantee nothing gets done.
The economics are perverse. If you're a mobile operator in a developing country, implementing an SS7 firewall costs money and provides no direct revenue benefit. Your customers don't know about SS7, they're not demanding protection, and there's no regulatory requirement to do it. So most operators don't. And because the network is interconnected, one vulnerable operator creates a path into the entire global system.
We're back to the weakest link problem. One carrier in a jurisdiction with no oversight and you've got a hole in the global network.
There are thousands of carriers. The four-oh-four Media piece I mentioned cited DHS saying that foreign adversaries are exploiting SS7 to track individuals in the United States. They're not hacking into US carriers directly. They're routing queries through carriers in other countries that have lax security, and those queries propagate through the interconnected SS7 network and reach US carriers looking like legitimate roaming requests.
A Chinese intelligence agency can buy SS7 access from a provider in, say, Nigeria, route a location query that looks like it's coming from a roaming partner, and get back the cell tower location of someone in Washington DC. And the US carrier just sees a normal roaming lookup.
That's exactly how it works. And it's not just China. The commercial SS7 access market is global and largely unregulated. There are companies that sell SS7 connectivity as a service. You pay a fee, you get access to the global signalling network, and you can run queries. Some of these companies do due diligence on their customers. Many don't. The Washington Post investigation from twenty fourteen found multiple companies openly advertising these services.
A decade later, and the situation hasn't materially changed.
It's actually gotten worse in some ways, because the number of entities with SS7 access has grown. Every new MVNO, every new IoT connectivity provider, every new roaming hub — they all get SS7 access. The attack surface keeps expanding.
What about five G? I've heard that five G was supposed to fix a lot of these signalling vulnerabilities. Is that happening, or is it marketing?
Five G does improve things significantly, but with important caveats. Five G uses a completely new core network architecture with an HTTP-based service-based interface instead of SS7's point-to-point signalling. It has mandatory security features like mutual authentication and encryption of signalling traffic. The protocol suite, as I mentioned, is Diameter and HTTP-two, not SS7.
Mandatory security features. That sounds promising.
It is, but there are two big catches. The first is that five G networks can operate in "non-standalone" mode, where the radio is five G but the core network is still four G. Most five G deployments today are non-standalone. You're getting five G speeds, but the signalling is still going through the four G core, which still uses SS7 for interoperability. The second catch is roaming. When you roam onto a partner network that doesn't support five G signalling, your connection falls back to older protocols. And as long as any part of the chain uses SS7, the vulnerabilities remain.
Five G standalone with no fallback is the goal, but we're years away from that being the global default.
There are parts of the world that still run two G and three G networks because the equipment is cheap and it works. Those networks aren't going anywhere. And as long as they exist, SS7 remains part of the global infrastructure.
Let me bring this back to Daniel's specific situation, because I think he's asking a practical question and we've given him a lot of technical detail. He lives in Jerusalem. He works in tech. He uses VPNs on airport Wi-Fi. Should he be using a VPN on cellular data?
My answer is yes, with the understanding of what it does and doesn't protect. Using a VPN on cellular data prevents your mobile carrier from building a profile of your browsing habits, your app usage, and your data patterns. In Israel, cellular carriers are subject to data retention laws and can be compelled to share data with security services. A VPN moves your internet traffic outside that jurisdiction. That's a meaningful privacy gain.
It's worth noting that Israel's signals intelligence capabilities are among the most sophisticated in the world. Unit eighty-two hundred. If anyone has SS7 exploitation capabilities, it's Israel. We saw that in the DHS bulletin.
So if Daniel's threat model includes state-level surveillance — and living in Jerusalem, working in tech, traveling internationally, there are reasonable arguments for that — then a VPN on cellular is a sensible layer. But it's just one layer. The bigger wins are using Signal instead of SMS and regular calls, disabling two G and three G, and being intentional about when your phone is connected to a network.
I think there's also a psychological aspect here that's worth naming. When you start learning about SS7 and stingrays and the surveillance capabilities that are out there, it's easy to feel helpless. Like, why bother with a VPN if the signalling layer is completely compromised? And I think the answer is that security is not binary. It's not "secure" or "insecure." It's about raising the cost and complexity for an adversary. Every layer you add makes you a harder target.
That's a really important point. SS7 exploitation requires either state-level capabilities or purchasing access from a commercial provider. It's not something your local cybercriminal is doing. If you're using a VPN, encrypted messaging, and you've disabled legacy network fallback, you've eliminated the low-hanging fruit. An attacker who wants to track you now needs SS7 access and the operational capability to use it. That's a much higher bar.
For most people, most of the time, that's sufficient. If you're a journalist, an activist, a dissident, or someone working with sensitive information, you need to go further. But for Daniel, who's a tech professional concerned about privacy, the combination of VPN plus Signal plus disabling legacy networks is a solid baseline.
I'd add one more thing. Be thoughtful about what you do on cellular versus what you do on a trusted Wi-Fi network. If you're going to do something sensitive, do it on a network you control, behind a VPN, on a device you've hardened. Don't do it on cellular in a public place where your SS7 location metadata could correlate with physical surveillance.
That's a good operational security point. The SS7 location data tells someone where you were. If that correlates with a camera or a witness, you've got a problem.
This is where we get into the second-order implications. The real power of SS7 surveillance isn't any single data point. It's the pattern over time. Where do you sleep? Where do you work? Who do you call regularly? What's your movement pattern? That's the kind of analysis that turns metadata into a targeting dossier. And it's all possible without ever touching the content of your communications.
The practical takeaway for Daniel is: yes, use a VPN on cellular, but don't think of it as a magic shield. Think of it as one layer in a defense-in-depth strategy. The bigger wins are moving your communications to encrypted platforms and being intentional about your device's connectivity.
If you really want to go deep, look into running a firewall on your phone that blocks all traffic except through the VPN tunnel. On Android, there are apps that do this. On iOS, it's a bit more limited, but you can configure always-on VPN with kill switch behavior. That way, if the VPN drops, your data doesn't leak onto the cellular connection.
I want to circle back to something you mentioned earlier about the history of SS7, because I think it's instructive. This protocol was designed in the nineteen seventies by engineers who assumed that only trusted state-owned telecom monopolies would ever connect to it. They couldn't have imagined a world with thousands of private operators, MVNOs, and commercial SS7 access providers operating out of jurisdictions with no oversight. The entire security model was based on a social assumption, not a technical one.
That's the recurring lesson in information security. Social assumptions age badly. The internet was built on the same trust model — the early ARPANET was a research network where everyone knew each other. Email was designed with no authentication because spam wasn't a concept yet. DNS had no security because nobody imagined DNS poisoning attacks. Every generation of engineers builds for the world they live in, and the next generation inherits the vulnerabilities.
Which is why I'm skeptical when people say five G is going to fix everything. The five G security model makes assumptions about the trustworthiness of network operators and the integrity of the supply chain. In twenty years, we'll be having this same conversation about whatever the five G equivalent of SS7 turns out to be.
There's actually a paper from a few years ago that analyzed five G security and found vulnerabilities in the roaming and interconnection protocols. The details are different from SS7, but the fundamental problem is the same: networks have to interoperate, interoperability requires trust, and trust can be exploited.
The cycle continues. Alright, let me try to summarize what we've covered for Daniel, because this has been a lot. SS7 is the signalling protocol that phone networks use to set up calls, route texts, and locate devices. It was built on a trust model with no authentication, and thousands of entities worldwide now have access to it. It can be used to track your location, intercept your calls and texts, and collect metadata about your communications. VPNs protect your internet traffic but don't protect your SS7 metadata or your regular phone calls. The practical steps are: use encrypted messaging for sensitive communications, disable legacy network fallback, use a VPN on cellular for IP traffic protection, and be intentional about when your phone is connected to a network.
That's a solid summary. And I'd add: this is not a theoretical concern. The DHS has confirmed that multiple foreign governments are actively exploiting SS7 to track people in the United States. The Washington Post documented commercial SS7 tracking services available for sale over a decade ago. The Economist called it "dangerously easy to hack the world's phones." This is real, it's ongoing, and the fixes are years or decades away.
The one thing I'd push back on slightly is the framing of "dangerously easy." It's easy if you have SS7 access, but getting SS7 access isn't trivial. You either need to be a state actor, or you need to find a commercial provider willing to sell you access, and those providers are increasingly cautious about who they do business with. The barrier to entry is real.
That's fair. The barrier is real, but it's lower than most people assume. The Nohl demonstration in twenty fourteen showed that a security researcher with a modest budget could get SS7 access through a commercial provider. The barrier is financial and reputational, not technical. If you have a few thousand dollars and a plausible business need, you can probably find a provider.
Which brings us back to threat modeling. If you're a target of a well-resourced adversary — a state intelligence agency, a large corporation, an organized crime group — SS7 is absolutely in their toolkit. If you're worried about your internet provider selling your browsing history, that's a different threat, and a VPN addresses it directly.
If you're not sure which category you fall into, err on the side of more protection. The cost of using Signal instead of SMS is essentially zero. The cost of running a VPN on your phone is a few dollars a month. The cost of disabling two G and three G is a few seconds in your settings menu. These are cheap defenses against capabilities that are expensive to deploy.
That's the asymmetry that makes this worth doing. Your marginal cost is near zero. Their marginal cost is significant. That's a trade you want to make every time.
One more thing I want to mention, because Daniel specifically asked about non-VoIP calls leaving metadata. Even if you're not using VoIP, even if you're making a regular cellular call, the content of that call is encrypted between your phone and the tower using the cellular encryption standard. On four G and five G, that encryption is actually quite strong. The SS7 vulnerability is not about breaking that encryption — it's about the metadata, the location data, and the call setup information. And in some cases, it's about redirecting calls before they reach the intended recipient.
The content of a regular cellular call is reasonably well-protected against passive interception, but the fact that you made the call, who you called, when, for how long, and where you were when you made it — all of that is available through SS7. And call redirection attacks can bypass the encryption entirely by making your call go somewhere else.
The call redirection attack is particularly nasty. An attacker with SS7 access can reroute your incoming calls to a number they control. Your caller dials your number, the network routes it to the attacker's device, the attacker records it, and then optionally forwards it to you so you don't notice anything wrong. This was demonstrated against a US congressman.
Alright, I think we've covered the technical and practical dimensions pretty thoroughly. Let me ask you a more philosophical question. We've been talking about SS7 as a vulnerability, but from the perspective of law enforcement and intelligence agencies, it's a capability. Where do you come down on the policy question? Should SS7 vulnerabilities be fixed, or should they be preserved for legitimate surveillance purposes?
That's the tension at the heart of this. The same SS7 capabilities that let China track dissidents also let Western intelligence agencies track terrorists. The same vulnerabilities that let criminals intercept calls also let law enforcement locate kidnapping victims. There's no clean way to fix SS7 that doesn't also eliminate surveillance capabilities that democratic governments consider essential.
We've seen this play out with encryption debates. The FBI versus Apple. The Crypto Wars. There's always this tension between security for the user and access for the state.
My view is that the vulnerabilities need to be fixed, even if it means losing surveillance capabilities. The reason is that the vulnerabilities are asymmetric. They're available to everyone with SS7 access, not just to responsible democratic governments. China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, criminal syndicates — they all have access to the same SS7 capabilities that Western intelligence agencies use. The net effect is that SS7 vulnerabilities make everyone less safe, even if they occasionally help catch a bad guy.
I'm not sure I agree. I think there's an argument that the surveillance capabilities provided by SS7 are essential for national security, and that fixing the vulnerabilities would make it harder to track threats. But I take your point that the vulnerabilities are democratized in a way that benefits adversaries more than it benefits us.
That's the key. If SS7 vulnerabilities were exclusively available to the Five Eyes intelligence alliance, you could make a case for preserving them. But they're not. They're available to anyone who can pay for SS7 access. The DHS bulletin confirms that multiple foreign adversaries are using these same capabilities against US persons. At that point, the vulnerabilities are a net liability.
I think we can agree that the current situation — where SS7 access is commercially available and largely unregulated — is the worst of all worlds. It doesn't provide exclusive access to legitimate law enforcement, and it doesn't protect ordinary people from surveillance.
Unfortunately, I don't see that changing anytime soon. The GSMA guidelines are voluntary. There's no international treaty governing SS7 security. Individual countries can require their carriers to implement firewalls, but that doesn't stop malicious queries from coming through foreign carriers. It's a global problem that requires global coordination, and global coordination on security issues is notoriously difficult.
Alright, I think we've given Daniel a thorough answer, and probably more than he bargained for.
And now: Hilbert's daily fun fact.
Hilbert: The volcanic gas plume from Kavachi, an active submarine volcano in the Solomon Islands, was measured in two thousand seven releasing over five hundred metric tons of sulfur dioxide per day during an eruptive phase. Medieval chroniclers in Europe had no idea it existed.
That's both geographically specific and chronologically disconnected in a way I appreciate.
Five hundred metric tons a day. That's a lot of sulfur dioxide.
The question we're left with, and I think this is what Daniel was really driving at, is how to think about privacy in a world where the infrastructure itself is compromised. You can't opt out of SS7. As long as you have a phone that connects to cellular networks, you're generating metadata that's accessible through a protocol designed before most of us were born. The practical steps we've outlined help, but they don't eliminate the problem. The long-term fix is architectural — moving to protocols that assume adversarial networks rather than trusted ones. Signal's design philosophy applied to telecom infrastructure. We're not there yet.
Until we are, it's about layers. VPNs, encrypted messengers, disabling legacy protocols, being intentional about connectivity. None of it is perfect, but together they raise the bar. And raising the bar matters.
Thanks to our producer Hilbert Flumingtop. This has been My Weird Prompts. If you want more conversations like this one, find us at myweirdprompts dot com. We'll be back with another one soon.
